[2] In an EYES ONLY cable on September 15, Secretary Rusk warned Ambassador Lodge that the coup envisioned in the Hilsman cable was definitely in suspense and that no effort should be made to stimulate any coup plotting. In turn, Conein challenged Don to produce proof that the coup group was actually authentic. Eisenhower made it clear to Diem that U.S. aid to his government during Vietnams hour of trial was contingent upon his assurances of the standards of performance [he] would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. Eisenhower called for land reform and a reduction of government corruption. Gi nh Mnh (T Gn - Si Gn Nh), Bn I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. ISBN:978-0-3002-1780-3, William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster This text is part of the JFK Papers: Kennedy Tapes, Tape/Conversation 104/A-40/004, Audio recording of President John F. Kennedy conversation with U.S. McCone said he felt that Kennedy agreed. By the time John F. Kennedy was president, the situation seemed hopeful for a momentlong enough for JFK to think of Vietnam as a sort of laboratory where he could try out tactics and techniques. Eisenhower's Letter of Support to Ngo Dinh Diem, October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. Today, the National Security Archive is posting for the first time materials from U.S. and Vietnamese archives that open the window into this pivotal event a little bit wider. Nhng In addition, Minh said it was vital that American foreign aid would continue to flow after a coup. [7] CIA, Saigon cable 1447, October 5, 1963, cited in Thomas L. Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo: Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954-1963. While in support themselves, Lodge and Harkins did not feel as though U.S. support had gone so far that the only option was to have a coup. The former ambassador argued that no one other than Diem could keep South Vietnam together. Anyone can read what you share. Johnson justifies involvement in Vietnam (April 1965) Ngo Dinh Diem explains why he rejects national elections (July 1955) Here we step back to take a broader view, not just focusing on the events of August but on the full panoply. mi nm ngm ngi (Trng Phu' Th) White House conversations took place without any principal figures changing their minds about the Saigon situation. With the exception of primary sources, all content on this website is Alpha History 2018. After a September lull, the coup plotters in Saigon began to strengthen in early October. Full text is unavailable for this digitized archive article. But within hours he would be deposed and 24 hours later summarily executed by the military. D. inhibit the growth of radical Islam. WASHINGTON, May 11-- Following is the text of a joint statement issued today by President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam at the conclusion of their talks: View Full . On this date, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam addressed a Joint Meeting of Congress. By this juncture, 1963, that optimism had evaporated and Kennedy felt that obstructionists in Saigon were losing ground against a communist insurgency. this page, 204, f.: Vietnam: Subjects: Top Secret Cables (Tab C) 10/3-10/27/63.. Ci If President Diem refused to jettison Nhu, then Diem would have to go as well. agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future rule Content created by Alpha History may not be copied, republished or redistributed without our express permission. Kennedy responds to a question on Vietnam (February 1962) Once American policymakers became aware that the coup plotters considered assassination a potential part of their plan they proceeded very carefully. Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. Modern History Sourcebook. Lodge had an active role in disentangling one of the most important obstacles to the coup when the South Vietnamese were moving into position. The US recognises self-governing Vietnam (February 1950), Final declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina (July 1954) Diem agreed to the needed reforms stipulated as a precondition for receiving aid, but he never actually followed through on his promises. permission is granted for commercial use of the Sourcebook. 2130 H Street, NW Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. held his first meeting with South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on August 26. Kennedy wanted Lodge to make a personal assessment. Robert F. Kennedys Kansas State University speech (March 1968) Sign up now to learn about This Day in History straight from your inbox. The CIAs chronology of its contacts with ARVN plotters (Document 13) shows that the initial contacts which plunged Washington into a frenzy of deliberations on whether to support a coup in Saigon occurred that day. Ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to proceed in a fashion that made clear to Diem that he needed to end nepotism and curtail the activities of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and other family members, whose efforts were impeding the counterinsurgency war then in progress. Rusk, McNamara urge US involvement in Vietnam (November 1961) General Tran Van Don, one of the coup plotters and a point of contact for CIA operative Lucien Conein (generalhieu.com). I have been unable to find the claimed McCone quote in any contemporary record. 183-186. The coup would take place in a window of late October-early November. The National Security Archive is committed to digital accessibility. The Saigon government was headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem, an autocratic, nepotistic ruler who valued power more than either his relations with the Vietnamese people or progress in fighting the communists. The National Security Archive documented this event in some detail in our 2003 electronic briefing book, where we presented the meeting agenda, a tape of the conversation, the NSC meeting record, and two draft cables to Saigon that the participants considered (2003 E-book, Documents 18, 19, 20, and 21 plus audio clip). ngh sao v C TT Ng nh Dim? I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. CIA operative Lucien Conein, who was a liaison to the generals leading up to the coup, in an undated photo from the 1960s (Credit: William J. JFK Library: Roger Hilsman Papers: Country File, b. ISBN:978-0-7006-1634-3, The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA's Heart of Darkness Unless otherwise indicated the source. The purpose of this offer is to assist people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected But it was too late. Again, the 2003 E-book presented an array of materials on these events (Documents 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28), ranging from Kennedys White House sessions to monitor events, to the CIA daily situation reports, to a cable relating several versions of how Diem and Nhu died, to a CIA retrospective analysis of press coverage of the deaths. We strive for accuracy and fairness. Minh identified the principal plotters, assured the CIA man a coup would take place in the near future, and outlined several possible coup options. Edict of Emperor Minh Mang against Christians in Vietnam (1833) They agreed that the coup plotters would deal only with Conein in the future. The Caravelle Manifesto criticises Diem and his regime (April 1960) They also sought to provide economic support to South Vietnam to bring needed reform to the area and . Don reported that Harkins clarified that his remarks about the non-desirability of a coup were inadvertent. Rather than revisit all of that debate, here we want to touch on a few points, presenting nuances in the form of the Thomas Hughes notes (Document 6) and meetings with Diem and Nhu that were taking place within this timeframe (Documents 8, 14, 15), amplifying the evidence. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Hilsman dominated the discussion, with Taylor doubting whether Saigon could get along without Diem, and McNamara sought assurances on four points. Cu JFKPapers: NSF: Country File: b. It contains 186,751 words in 265 pages and was updated last on March 27th, 2022. Plus, we've got an entire learning guide devoted to this document. Primary Source. National Security Archive: George McT. TT US Defence pamphlet: Know Your Enemy: the Viet Cong (March 1966) . Permission is granted for electronic copying, distribution in print form for educational A report into French atrocities in Vietnam (1933) JFK Library: John Newman Papers: Notebook, August 24-31, 1963.. b mt c tit l sau 40 nm (T Gn) Viet Cong Program, 1962 [At this Site] Charles de Gaulle: France's Attitude Toward US Policy in Vietnam 1964 [At this Site] Tonkin Gulf Incident 1964 [At Yale] [Internet Archive version here] The Tonkin Bay Resolution 1964 [At this Site] ND c c lm Th Tng (HNT & TTN), TT Technical Directorate, VN Coastal Raiders The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborations within. John F. Kennedy addresses the UN on Vietnam (September 1961) Tng Thng Ng The PICL of November 2 (Document 27) records that Diem and Nhu had been killed. aggression through military means. SAIGON, Vietnam, Oct. 24 -- In a letter to Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, President Eisenhower has expressed the hope that "indispensable reforms" would be carried out by South Vietnam in connection with the receipt of United States aid. Cross examination of Captain Ernest Medina (1970), Muhammad Ali explains his refusal to fight in Vietnam (March 1967) Following the Geneva Convention, President Eisenhower and the United States supported Ngo Dinh Diem. In one case we also had a record made by a senior Pentagon participant, Major General Victor Krulak. vn hai cu tng Khim v Xun Vn As we demonstrated in our 2009 E-book the reality was more complex. The Presidents Intelligence Checklist for the morning of November 1 began with an update that a coup had begun in Saigon. [3] At the same time Lodge was involved in a spat with the CIA over changing its station chief in Saigon. Ambassador Frederick Nolting that he would make no such move against the Buddhists, Harriman and Ball were no longer sure of Diems intentions. Other History Sourcebooks: African | East Asian | Indian | Islamic |Jewish | Lesbian and Gay | Science | Women's | Global, Letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, October 23, 1954, Letter from President Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Council of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater The coup against Diem has been a much-debated passage in the history of the American war in Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, bow an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. If you do reduplicate the document, indicate November 15, 1954, pp.735-736. (Credit:LBJ Presidential Library). ngh sao v C TT Ng nh Dim? The receptions during the visit were in large part organized by the American . All articles are regularly reviewed and updated by the HISTORY.com team. 4, f.: Vietnam 9/119/20/63 [II]. Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Paul Kattenburg met with President Diem for three hours on August 28. Reprinted from The Department of State Bulletin (November 15, 1954), pp. v cc ng bo nn nhn Ho Chi Minh seeks Vietnamese independence in Paris (1919) A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative was approached during the time of U.S. 4th of July festivities by South Vietnamese military officers who wanted U.S. support for a coup detat that might overthrow Diem (2003 E-book, document 1). Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. General Minh renewed the August call for an expression of U.S. support for a coup. Le Duan reminds agents in the South of tactics (November 1965) needed reforms. New documents and extracts will be added regularly. At the State Department, W. Averell Harriman and George Ball agreed that Lodge ought to delay his arrival in Saigon until the situation had calmed somewhat (Document 4). by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their The United States' changing connection with Vietnam is demonstrated by the letters from Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy to President Ngo Dinh Diem, as Anderson's chapter "The United States and Vietnam" in-depth examines. civilians murdered in Hue City in 1968. Eisenhower's letter of support to Ngo Dinh Diem (October 1954) An American press report on the Binh Xuyen (April 1955) Ngo Dinh Diem explains why he rejects national elections (July 1955) Le Duan: 'The path of revolution in the South' (1956) Ngo Dinh Diem addresses a joint session of the US Congress (1957) According to Lodges report of the two-hour discussion, many of the points he raised were nearly verbatim with those he discussed with Kennedy on August 15 including the importance of U.S. public opinion, the role of Madame Nhu, and the recent unrest in Saigon. Our mission is to engage, educate, and inspire all learners to discover and explore the records of the American people preserved by the National Archives. President Kennedy acted mostly as moderator. We do not reproduce this here because we presented it in both the previous electronic briefings on this subject. of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam A broadcast by Viet Cong propagandist Hanoi Hannah (April 1970) Reprinted from The US Congress Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964) As the fall progressed in Washington, numerous lists were drawn up of South Vietnamese leaders who could potentially replace the Diem government. In a follow-up meeting the next day, another briefing by William Colby summarized the scene in Saigon. The next day, Nolting added that the notion of a coup was based on a bad principle and would set a bad precedent, a statement that impressed National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy (Documents 11, 12). European and World history. On August 27 Ambassador Nolting took center stage. since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. Presenting his credentials to Diem on August 26 (Document 8), Ambassador Lodge got 10 minutes to explain the role of public opinion in setting U.S. policy, advising that the Saigon leader release Buddhist prisoners, after which Diem minimized the importance of Buddhists, then treated him to a two-hour harangue on his family and South Vietnam as an underdeveloped country. part3. JFK sent a succession of study groups to SaigonHuntington Sheldon of the CIA, Robert McNamara plus Maxwell Taylor, General Krulak plus Joseph Mendenhallall to report to him. Unless otherwise indicated the specific electronic form of the document is copyright. A US report on Soviet aid to North Vietnam (November 1965), US MACV memo on winning the Vietnam War (September 1965) On October 23, Don had another get-together with CIAs Conein (Document 21) where he demanded assurances on the U.S. stance and the intelligence officer was able to answer in a way that satisfied Washington guidelines. News of ARVNs request for backing of a coup reached Kennedy as his presidents daily brief (then called the Presidents Intelligence Checklist, or PICL) was reporting that Ngo Dinh Nhu was indeed behind the Pagoda Raids, and that Nhu and Diem were issuing direct orders to military officers, leaving out the ARVN chain of command (Document 7). We have since continued to collect material, and Luke Nichters presentation of the Kennedy-Lodge tape from mid-August offers a good opportunity to revisit the coup. John Prados: for Medieval Studies.The IHSP recognizes the contribution of Fordham University, the v. t. e. Ng nh Dim, the President of South Vietnam, made a state visit to the United States, the main ally of his government, in 1957. Articles with the HISTORY.com Editors byline have been written or edited by the HISTORY.com editors, including Amanda Onion, Missy Sullivan and Matt Mullen. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup . They emphasized, we believe that Vietnam is not faced with any serious shortage of effective non-Communist leadership. Thomas L. Hughes, INRs director, remains proud today of the list his experts assembled in 1963. several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under honor the ARVN Heoes. contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Colonel Robert Heinl: The Collapse of the Armed Forces (1971) SOURCE: JFKL: JFKP: National Security File . Former Ambassador Frederick Nolting seemed to be the lone dissenting voice, arguing that Diem was the only figure who could hold South Vietnam together. From: President Eisenhower To: Ngo Dinh Diem Date: October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. military means. He also spoke of how in a previous coup (1960), time had played in favor of Diem, not against him. Communist Lodge left for Saigon, planning to stop in Hawaii and Japan on his way to receive various briefings and touch base with senior U.S. officials. Viet Minh call to arms against the Japanese (March 1945) Eisenhowers letter of support to Ngo Dinh Diem (October 1954) Kennedy and Lodge discussed the kinds of challenges Lodge was likely to face upon arrival, and how he proposed to deal with the Diem government. On the morning of October 5, Lucien Conein, acting as intermediary, met with Gen. Duong Van Big Minh. When South Vietnamese military officers renewed their contacts with CIA operatives in early October, the Vietnamese immediately raised the option of assassination. Nhu commented that the South Vietnamese military officers, many of whom were Buddhist themselves, started off in sympathy with the Buddhists following the uprising that occurred in Hue on May 8. the specific electronic form of the document is copyright. Letter from President Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, October 23, 1954 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. purposes and personal use. At the same time, there was a growing view within the South Vietnamese government that Nhu was disliked, hated, feared, or distrusted at all levels in the bureaucracy, the military establishment and urban elite circles., JFK Papers: NSF: Country File, b.200, f.: Vietnam 10/610/14/63, CIA Reports.. A Viet Cong member reflects on its approach to war (1985) Kennedy did a lot of agreeing, letting Lodge talk, but the two concurred the press in Saigon posed a problem, JFK expressed the sense that something would have to be done about Diem, but he didnt want to be driven to that by the press, and he was not yet certain who, other than Diem, the U.S. could support in Saigon. PFC Meadlo on his role in the killings at My Lai (November 1969) [9] Document number deleted, October 28, 1963, FRUS, v. IV, p. 449. Diem and Nhu seemed to desire to present Lodge with a fait accompli regarding the Buddhists upon his arrival in Saigon. Letter From Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem - The Vietnam War A Letter From Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President, I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. Although the IHSP seeks to follow all applicable copyright law, Fordham University is not The George Washington University Add all page(s) of this document to activity: The 1954 Geneva Accords had called for a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallelcreating a Communist state in the North and a French-backed non-Communist state in the South. hc t mt s tun tit (TS Lm L Trinh), Cu and to remember the thousands of Bi FRUS, IV, pp. JFK Was More Inclined toward Regime Change than Earlier Believed, Newly Released JFK Tape and President's Intelligence Checklists Fill in Gaps in Record, South Vietnamese Leader's Notes Published for First Time, Written Hours before Assassination, Edited by John Prados and McNamara and Taylors report on South Vietnam (October 1963) For his part, Nhu also came off as more and more ominous (Document 15). McCone shot back that the best line was no line. Ultimately his refusal to make any substantial changes to meet the needs of the people led to extreme civil unrest and eventually a coup by dissident South Vietnamese generals in which Diem and his brother were murdered. Ng nh Dim: Ti thit min Nam (HNT & TTN), Ci He actually reached Saigon two days after their conversation (August 23, Washington date). President Kennedy decided to replace his ambassador to Saigon, Frederick E. Nolting, and appointed Henry Cabot Lodge to that position. example of supporting information for nhs job application,
